Showing posts with label 7th Light Cavalry. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 7th Light Cavalry. Show all posts

Thursday, 9 November 2017

BRIGADIER MASUD KHAN SATTI aka "Tommy Masud"




Massaud Khan Satti aka “Tommy Masud” was born on 7th March 1912.
Date of Commission, 01 Sep 1932 (or 28 January 1932) 

Parent unit: 7th Light Cavalry.
Alma Mater: R.M.A.S (Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, UK)
R.I.M.C. (Prince of Wales, Royal Indian Military College), Dehra Dun (India).


He was commissioned as 2/Lt on the Unattached List for the Indian Army 28 January 1932 (or 01 Sep 1932). He then spent a year’s attachment to the 2nd battalion Lancashire Fusiliers in India, joining the 7th Light Cavalry on the 4 January 1934. He was affectionately called “Tommy Masud” by his friends.

He was the first Muslim CO of 11 Cav in 1947. He spearheaded move towards Srinagar in 1948 with his Stuarts armoured cars without clearance from GHQ.


“Tommy Masud” thrashed a British officer (Commandant Punjab Centre) at Jhelum Club in 1948. He was then thrown into the swimming pool by 11 Cav officers. Being a Sandhurst graduate and with a King’s Commission, action could not be taken as it required assent of the king. Tommy Masud was very famous figure in Lahore Gymkhana, finally settled in Lahore, where he died in the late 1990s.



The unit conducted very aggressive actions under his able leadership, one of the proofs of which i.e two captured Indian Armour-ed cars of the 7th light Cavalry still adorn the front of the unit quarter guard. Tommy Masud was remembered with great respect and admiration by many reservists and old timers both from the officers and the rank and file who were attached with or visited the unit. 


Capture of Bhimber, Baghsar and Mirpur


Through their daring and bold actions, Bhimber, Baghsar and Mirpur were captured and the threat to Mangla head works and Jhelum was eliminated.


"As well entrenched Dogras could not be dislodged, Colonel Masud Satti, known as Tommy Masood, dispatched armoured cars under Captain Nawaz, they hit the Dogra Citadel at dawn on 24th of October, causing panic, and Dogras abandoned the town in confusion." 




In November 1947 Colonel (Later Brigadier) Masud Khan volunteered entirely on his own to attack Srinagar along axis Murree-Srinagar which if done would have led to Srinagar’s capture.Major General Akbar Khan wrote about this incident in his book and described it in the following words; ‘On return to Pindi,I was immediately able to find Masud who volunteered to take not two,but a whole squadron of his unit (P.A.V.O 11 Cavalry) armoured cars. His men he said would go in plain clothes and without official permission and at their own risk’ (Refers-Page-41 & 42-Raiders in Kashmir- Ex Major General Akbar Khan,D.S.O-Pak Publishers Limited-2 Victoria Road-Karachi-First Printed-1970).


Akbar wrote that he was thrilled and held a meeting with Brigadier Sher Khan (then probably DMO) Lieutenant Colonel Arbab and Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan who as per Akbar ‘stoutly opposed the idea. And so the proposal was abandoned’ .Thus the chicken heartedness of these men ie Brigadier Lion Khan and the Raja etc led to the failure to grasp a fleeting operational opportunity when Indian Armoured cars were about three to four days march from Srinagar which they reached only on 7th November! (Refers-Page-276-The Indian Armoured Corps-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-1941-1971-Major General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Vision Books-New Delhi-1993). Thus Srinagar was lost between 30th October and 4th November when this fateful conference took place, not because Pakistan did not have armoured cars, not because there was an all weather road to carry armoured cars between Murree and Srinagar; but because it lacked the political and military will,and its Muslim League Ministers as well as army Brigadiers like Sher Khan who were at the helm of affairs did not listen to indomitable men like Tommy Masud! No wonder that Tommy Masud ever went beyond Brigadier! He lacked the suitable ethnic qualification, to give him that particular quota boost, about which all old officers of the pre 1971 era know; or the peculiar professional qualification of being a drill sergeant major type soldier, which was very much in demand, for promotion to higher ranks, in the army of the period 1951-1966 to go beyond the rank of brigadier!



We are lucky to have an independent account confirming Masud’s initiative written by another brilliant artillery officer who was the architect of Pakistani success in Grand Slam and at Chawinda but was not promoted because he lacked the quality of mulish lack of intellect which was a must for artillery officers to have, in order to go beyond brigadier in the pre 1971 army! This is what Brigadier Amjad Ali Khan had to say about the affair of the P.A.V.O armoured car initiative: -



‘ I remember an afternoon in October 1948,in Rawalpindi when I attended a conference of general Tariq who by now coordinating the operations of the tribesmen and Mujahids in Kashmir.I was then Adjutant 2 Field Artillery Regiment. The tribesmen and the Mujahids had been stopped 4 miles outside Srinagar by an Indian Battalion. There was a requirement of armoured cars to break this ring to enable the Mujahids and tribal lashkars to continue their advance into Srinagar.Major Mohammad Masud of P.A.V.O Cavalry Regiment, who was there,sought permission to use a troop of his armoured cars to break through the thin layer of enemy infantry and open the way for the mujahids to enter Srinagar . The reaction of some of those attending the conference to this suggestion surprised me .One of the objections raised was that the tribesmen might damage the palaces of the Maharaja .Another dissenting voice pointed out that it would indicate the presence of Pakistani regular troops inside Kashmir. While this discussion was going on Raja Ghazanfar Ali ,who was at that time a Central Minister,entered the conference room accompanied by Mr. Hameed Nizami. The Minister after having been briefed expressed his regret that no regular troops could be permitted to enter Kashmir’ (Refers-Page-6-September 65-Before and After-Brigadier Amjad Ali Khan Chaudhry (Retired)-Ferozesons-Lahore-1976)



I have reproduced this incident particularly for civilians who do not understand why the army’s younger lot in 1950 was disgusted with the civilian leadership,and why the so called Pindi Conspiracy case occurred.The men who were part of the Pindi Conspiracy were not as ridiculous as painted by a civil servant in a book written in the late 1990s (Zaheer’s book on the Pindi Conspiracy).Mr Zaheer knew about the military facts of the Kashmir War only as much as a spinster ! These men had proved their mettle in WW Two and in 1948 war and were genuinely disgusted with the civilian as well as the higher military leadership,as can be imagined from the above mentioned incident.Had there been a man with Patel’s resolution and decisiveness to assist the Quaid,the army would have had nothing to be unhappy about!The army that took over in 1958 was however not composed of men who had fought well in WW Two,but of clever extension seekers who had nothing to do with the 1948 War.



This then was our tragedy.The old man leading us without having done any armed forces war course, had the ‘Coup d Oeil’ in October 1947 to order that one brigade should advance along axis Sialkot-Jammu and capture Jammu while another Brigade advance along axis Murree-Srinagar and capture it’ (Refers-Page-343- Report of November 7,1947- Mountbatten’s ‘Top Secret’ Personal Reports as Viceroy of India -India Office Library-L/PO/433. Page-154- Looking Back- Mehr Chand Mahajan- Asia Publishing House London-1963) .Nehru had a Patel,while Jinnah had no Patel;and this included the entire cabinet,whether Hindustani Punjabi Bengali Sindhi or Pathan, consisted of decent amiable men who had been good British subjects, and most unfortunate even no Thimaya or Bucher or Cariappas.We had Akbars and Masuds ,but these were sidelined!They did not have that pleasant personality that could please a politician and could get extensions,or the height or frame to be a Hollywood hero!They were men of action known for decisiveness in the crossing of Chindwin…rather than tactical timidity and poor war record while serving in a Chamar regiment in Burma!No wonder that Mr Jinnah complained in 1930s about the Muslim leaders that he had ,who in his words asked the Deputy Commissioner before doing anything!

Source : A.H AMIN


                                                       

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Photo contributed by Lt Col Salman Aslam, Retd (2nd SSC).


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